Tag Archives: America

Would you work more hours if it meant you didn’t have to do housework?

I don’t have a catchier title, but this *is* a question I’ve been pondering. When I was young I thought that having someone else do housework for you was the height of luxury, but these days it doesn’t seem to be that uncommon. I don’t know anyone who paints their own fence, mows their own yard, or cleans their own roof. These jobs used to be seen as just part of owning a house, either you did it or you forced your kid to do it as part of their chores. But it seems nowadays most people hire professionals to do it instead.

Even the most basic housework has been outsourced, with services available to clean your bathroom and kitchen twice a month, or your whole house if you like. And of course think about restaurants and fast food: eating outside your own home has almost doubled in the past 50 years. That’s a lot less meals that people have to cook, a lot less dishes they have to clean, and even less groceries that they have to buy.

So housework is being outsourced, and is it related to how Americans seem to work many more hours than the rest of the developed world?

Shifting gears now, I’ve written before about the Europe vs America economic debates. Inevitably in such debates, the conversation shifts to working hours, workers in Europe work less hours than workers in America.

But Josh Barro on twitter has pushed back against claims about European quality-of-life: they don’t have dryers. Reddit too has a huge thread about the lack of dryers and high-energy appliances in Europe. Can a place without such creature comforts really be comfortable?

I don’t want to dwell on the dryer debate. Yes Europeans can dry their clothes in the sun. Yes, it may be cheaper. But does it require more work? Is an electric dryer not a labor-saving device that lets you cut out the work of hanging up your clothes and taking them down?

And coming back to housework, doesn’t paying someone to do your housework also save you from doing that labor? And if so, how much is your time worth it to you? To restate the question from the title of this post: if working 45 hours a week instead of 40 meant you never had to do housework, would you take it?

Some people like doing housework, I get that. But for most people, it’s a chore. And so I wonder if Americans on the whole have made a choice: they work more at work so they can work less at home, and I wonder if anyone has quantified this. European’s extra housework may not show up in the metrics, but it should still be quantified to know if Americans really do “work more hours.”

Working at work vs working at home is a dichotomy any student of economic history understands. When women first entered the private sector workforce, it didn’t mean that women *started working*, and that they weren’t working before that. Women had been doing work at home without pay since the dawn of time. If you calculate the labor done by homebound women and compare it to the paid labor plus housework done by working women, women’s’ overall working hours went down when they entered the workforce. They could use the money they made at work to pay for other people’s labor or labor-saving devices at home.

Men had also taken this leap from housework to paid work centuries before. During the days of subsistance farming, men, women, everyone had to do a hell of a lot of odd jobs to keep themselves housed, clothed, and fed, even when they weren’t actively “working” on their farm. This is why claims of how few hours medieval farmers worked are so misleading: they had many “holidays,” sure, but besides attending church those days would still be spent doing work around the house even if they wouldn’t be spent in the field.

If you were a medieval peasant, you might have a roof that needs mending, food that needs preserving, you need a new chair to fix the old one, a new patch to cover the hole in your cloak, and you had to do all this yourself or it wouldn’t get done. It didn’t show up in “hours worked” because it’s housework in the home. But it still needed to be done to maintain quality of life.

When men started moving from farms to factories, they traded their labor in for money, and could then use that money to *have their roof fixed, buy their own food, buy a new chair, or have their cloak patched*. They could use money to get someone else to do labor for them. They started working *less hours* when you account for both house work and factory work.

Factories workers worked a *lot*. But subsistence farmers worked far more for far less. But if you only calculate “hours worked” using work *outside* the house, then you’d wrongly conclude that subsistence farmers lived cushy lives and that women’s liberation destroyed women’s free time. Nothing could be further from the truth, instead, people these days work much more outside the house in exchange for working much less in it.

And I wonder how much that feeds in to the America vs Europe debate on working hours. How much labor do Europeans do around their homes that Americans *don’t* do. How much labor do Americans save by using dryers, by hiring landscapers, by hiring homecleaners, and are they happy with the extra hours they work to afford that? Do Americans work more hours to save themselves from housework?

Not knowing your Enemies

One of the oldest maxims in military strategy is this: know your enemies. Colonel Santiago of the Spartans added “do not forget above all to yourself.” It’s amazing how badly people fail at this most basic maxim when “knowing your enemy” requires understanding their political goals and ideology instead of just guessing how many tanks and artillery pieces they have on hand.

a nuclear explosion

I’ve been watching a lot of Indy Neidell recently. For those who don’t know, he’s a youtube historian who presents a lot of programs where he recounts the history of a conflict in chronological order. He has presented “World War 1: Week by Week,” “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Day by Day,” and “The attack on Pearl Harbor: Minute by Minute.” It’s the Cuban Missile Crisis I’d like to talk about today.

I’m sure you all know the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis: the Soviet Union puts nukes in Cuba and the world sits on the brink of Armageddon as America and the Soviets decide if they want to nuke each other or not. Eventually the Soviets agree to remove the nukes on Cuba in exchange for America removing its nukes in Turkey, and a direct phone line is established between DC and Moscow so the leaders of the two superpowers can try to hash things out more peacefully in the future.

But what’s striking about the crisis is that no one involved understood each other’s motives, and that nearly led to ruin.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was the first mover. He was upset that America could threaten him with nukes from Turkey while he couldn’t threaten America with a similar first-strike. He placed nukes in Cuba so he could have such a threat in his back pocket.

Castro was mostly a bystander in the crisis, a sad state of affairs since it was his nation that the crisis was about. Castro was sold the idea that the nukes were there to protect Cuba from any future Bay Of Pigs style invasion. He thought the nukes were primarily for his benefit, and urged the Soviets to give him operational control over them.

When America found out about the nukes, they completely misunderstood things. They seemed primarily worried about West Germany, and thought the nukes were there to distract them from an upcoming West Berlin crisis. Or that the nukes were to dissuade them from coming to Germany’s aid if the Soviets invaded there. Throughout the crisis, many American decision-makers remained stuck on the question of “how does this relate to West Berlin?”

It’s somewhat understandable that the American thought this way, since West Berlin was so important to them. It was the shining beacon of freedom in the middle of Soviet Communism. And every East German who escaped to West Berlin was a diplomatic coup, proof positive that the Western system was better, and that Communism was *so bad* that it was the first government in history that needed to build a wall to keep citizens *in*.

But this fixation caused America to dangerously misjudge the USSR during the crisis. They didn’t understand that Khrushchev and Castro had their own motives for doing this, and American policy-makers were constantly looking for a West Berlin connection. America made plans to knock out the nuclear missiles in Cuba either with air strikes or a ground invasion. These ideas were ultimately shelved partly because “what if the Soviets want to tie us down here while they invade West Berlin?”

But what America *should* have realized was that the Soviets weren’t going to install nuclear missiles on Cuba without a *lot* of troops to guard them. The proposed American ground invasion would have been *severely* outnumbered by the USSR Red Army troops that America didn’t know were on the island. And that’s without even mentioning the tactical nukes that were also there to guard the strategic nukes. An American invasion would have been a slaughter, possibly including the use of said tactical nukes against the US Navy, but the Americans assumed Cuba was a small sideshow because that was how they saw it themselves.

And while the USSR was *more* interested in Cuba than the Americans thought, they were *less* interested in Cuba than Castro thought. When the USSR was moving the nukes out, Castro threw a fit and tried in vain to retain control of the tactical nukes. This earned him no favor in Moscow, as the USSR wanted to bring everything home and put the whole thing put behind them. The end of the crisis created a lot of bad blood between Cuba and the USSR, when it could have been a unifying moment instead.

In fact, I saw much the same level of American misunderstanding in Indy Neidell’s series on the Korean War. Yet again the Americans began this war being most worried about Germany, “what if they want us to pull our troops from Europe into this war in Korea?” This hamstrung troop movements and decision-making in the crucial early stages when South Korea was being overrun.

Later on, the Americans showed another failure of understanding that I’ve seen repeated in the modern day: the assumption that their enemies were united and working in lock-step against them.

The idea went like this: the USSR, China, and North Korea were all Communist. Communists were all opposed to America, and thus Communists all moved in lock-step to work against America. It became clear early on that the USSR wasn’t moving its European troops to support North Korea, and that the USSR would *not* join the Korean War with ground forces. That proved (in America’s mind) that the Korean War *was* just a side-show, and that they had to remain focused on protecting West Berlin.

It *also* proved that the “Forces of Communism” were willing to cut North Korea loose and not support them if US troops occupied the North. If the USSR wasn’t supporting them, you could be damn well sure China wasn’t supporting them either, because the two moved in lock-step. And that meant no ground forces would swoop in to aid North Korea, meaning America was free to occupy the whole country.

The USSR certainly treated Korea with less importance than its European commitments. But the Communists were *not* operating in lock-step, and China was willing, even eager to send ground forces to Korea. More than just fighting the Capitalists, China wanted to prove that the “Century of Humiliation” was over, and that the Communists had brought China back to being a super-power on the world’s stage, able to go toe to toe with anyone.

America took the lack of USSR ground troops as proof that the Forces of Communism were in no way prepared to fight them face to face in Korea. American generals and planners ignored the massive amount of Chinese ground troops even as those troops moved into Korea to start fighting. America failed to understand: China was willing to fight even if the Soviets weren’t.

This strange idea, that our enemies are all united and move in lock-step against us, is a common one amongst small-minded jingoists. Jingoists are often too intellectually stunted to understand other people having motives that don’t involve them. In the 50s that meant they didn’t realize how important Korea was to China, because Korea was a sideshow for the jingoists. In the modern day, I’ve seen jingoists propose that Iran, China, and Russia are acting in unison to oppose American interests, rather than each nation acting in its own interests even if their interest sometimes align with each other.

When Iran launched missiles at Israel, it was suggested by morons that this was in part because Russia wanted to take America’s attention and effort away from Ukraine. When the Houthis shut down Red Sea Trade, this was supposedly done because Iran wanted to help Russia by hurting Europe. And the whole war in Ukraine itself is supposedly part of China’s big strategy to put pressure on America and Europe so China can swoop in and take Taiwan.

Let’s get one thing clear: this is nonsense cooked up by morons. Russia, Iran, China, the Houthis, they all have their own beliefs, goals, and strategies. China is no more ordering Russia around than the USSR ordered China around in the Korean War. Iran is supporting the Houthis but the Houthis act mostly on their own initiative.

And this misunderstanding continues on to suggestions of strategy. There is a stupid video-game ideology that goes through the heads of jingoists: if we cut off the command center we end the rest of the war. So they propose war in Iran to stop the Houthis and war in Russia to contain China.

Yet history tells us that we time and time again misunderstand the motives of our enemies. America thought the Cuban missile crisis revolved around Europe, and believed that a resolution to the crisis must be sought there.

They were wrong.

Khrushchev offered to remove his nukes from Cuba in exchange for American nukes from Turkey, because that was what he was focused on all along. This surprised the Americans. In fact Khrushchev announced this “deal” before Kennedy and co had even agreed to it, or even heard of it, they learned it from the newspapers and were obliged to go along with it as the best way to exit the crisis.

Throughout the entire Cuban Missile Crisis and Korean War, America misunderstood its enemies, believed them to be united in opposing America, and was fixated only on what *it* saw as important. This led to failures and near catastrophe, as they didn’t predict China would enter Korea and didn’t think the Soviets would send tens of thousands of troops to guard a strategic “backwater” like Cuba.

If America had understood that China and the USSR were not joined at the hip, they might have stopped their troops half-way up the Korean peninsula and allowed the Republic of Korea to invade north on its own, since China had said that they wouldn’t attack if only Korean forces came north. Maybe Korea would have been unified. And if America had understood that the USSR was more worried about American nukes in Turkey than American bases in Germany, then they wouldn’t have courted disaster with a plan to send a few thousand troops against a vastly superior Red Army garrison in Cuba.

I’d hope that modern jingoists would take these lessons to heart, and understand that our enemies have initiative and agency all their own. Sadly most do not.

Is it culture? Or is it incentives?

The Internet in general is US-centric. So even on the European parts of the Internet it’s common for countries (or the entire continent) to compare themselves to America. There are thousands of things you could compare, but the most contentious is probably the economic comparisons. America has recently grown much more strongly than Europe, and it doesn’t take an economist to realize that nearly all of the world’s top companies and startups are located in America. San Fransisco alone has more billion-dollar startups than entire countries, and before you say “that’s just silicon valley,” New York and Boston aren’t far behind.

There are a million ways to explain this discrepancy and plenty of reasons why Europeans may even think it’s good. We could talk all day about whether worker’s rights are fundamentally incompatible with cut-throat capitalism, and if Europe has therefore chosen the better path. But the most flawed reason I see bandied about is that Europe just has the wrong culture for this kind of stuff.

Europe is more laid back, less aggressive. Their investors prefer same, consistent gains. The European mindset isn’t focused on innovation, and culturally Europeans aren’t focused on business the way Americans are.

I think these explanations are wrong and dumb, and I’d use more expletive words if I hadn’t made a New Year’s Resolution not to do so in my writing. I don’t think Europeans are culturally less attuned to startups and Big Business, I think the legal framework prevents it.

Not long ago, Europe was seen as the beating heart of innovation and technology. Industrial progress, scientific progress, just go to any chemistry or physics class and see how many formulas are named for Germans. But now America dominates the industries, and I think it’s because of government, not culture.

The American business framework provides significant bankruptcy protection. People mocked Trump for his many bankruptcies, but most investors know that 90% of good ideas fail and the last 10% have to cover those loses. Bankruptcy is a way for investors to mitigate their downside, and thus allows for bigger risks to be taken.

The American financial system also gives significant benefits to investors, giving them greater flexibility in buying and selling their company to whomever they wish. Until Biden and Trump brought protectionism back to the fore, it was not uncommon to see American companies sold to foreign investors with little fanfare. Nativists and racists may complain about *gasp* Chinese people owning an American company, but from the investor’s perspective selling the company is a good way to cash out his winnings from the investment. Foreign buyers compete with American buyers, and this increase in demand means prices go up. This means the sale price of companies goes up, and that increases the returns on an investor’s investment.

But long before Trump, Europe was made famous in the tech world for blocking foreign buyers from its companies. Again, nativists wrongly think that this strengthens the European tech industry by “keeping it in European hands.” But when an investor sells out, they get cash in return. What do you think they do with that cash? They don’t hoard it like Smaug the Dragon, they reinvest it. Because they’re investors. By blocking foreign buyers, you reduce buying pressure, you reduce how much money investors can get out of their investment, and you therefore reduce their upside potential. Is it any wonder then they’d prefer a safer investment, when Europe is happy to cap the gains on any risky tech investment they make?

And Europe prides itself on fining big tech companies for any reason whatsoever. But surely it’s obvious that a government hostile to profitable tech companies would scare off anyone wanting to make a profitable tech company near them. Better to start in America or get out of Europe ASAP. Microsoft and Apple can afford billion dollar fines, but such sanctions could be lethal to a smaller European tech company. So again investors are scared off, entrepreneurs are scared off, and Europe wonders why it doesn’t have a tech sector.

“But what about ASML and Spotify!” And what about them? For every single, solitary European company that manages to rise above the hostile governing environment, there are 10 American companies that rose under easier circumstances. Spotify started in 2006, and since then Massachusetts alone has started Draft Kings, Moderna and Intellia Therapeutics, all of comparable value to Spotify. And Massachusetts has half the population of Sweden.

People respond to incentives, and the incentives for risky tech investment are very poor in Europe. Bankruptcy is easier in America, returns are (or were before Biden and Trump) less likely to be capped by protectionist policies, and (before Biden) the government generally has taken a more lax approach to dealing with corporations. You can debate if these things are good or bad, but I find them far more likely reasons for America’s tech dominance than “culture” or “attitude.”